Part 2 of Free Will / Predestination

Free Will / Predestination by Max Herrera

Before I can answer this question, I need to distinguish among (1) determinism and (2) free-will, and (3) predestination:

Determinism results from two tenets: causality and universal determinism. Causality teaches that (1) every effect has a cause (i.e., that an effect comes to be from a cause) and that (2) every effect is determined by its cause (i.e., what an effect comes to be arises from its cause). Universal determinism teaches that every cause is itself caused by a previous cause. For example, if someone pushes you, and resultantly, you fall and injure a child, who should be held responsible for the injured child? You or the person who pushed you? Answer: the latter is responsible because had he not pushed you, the child would not have been injured. In other words, he is the cause of the injured child. Finally, if determinism is true, all things must be as they are and they cannot be other than they are.

 

In contradistinction to determinism, the free-will position affirms causality, but denies universal determinism. That it is to say, they deny that every cause itself is caused by a previous cause. Therefore, it is possible for things to be other than they are (i.e., not all effects are necessary).

 

Now, all traditional Christians will agree that God previously knows the destination, heaven or hell, of all human beings. So at a minimum, the definition of predestination will include God’s foreknowing the destination of all persons.

 

However, some Christians, Calvinists, maintain that the aforementioned definition is too narrow. They maintain that the definition of predestination should also include God’s determining the destinations of all people. In other words, Calvinists presuppose that determinism should be included in the definition of predestination. Consequently, for the Calvinist, God determines who goes to heaven and who goes to hell, and things cannot be other that they are. In other words, they believe in double predestination: the predestination of the saved to heaven and the predestination of the lost to hell. According to the Calvnist, man cannot freely choose to respond to the gospel because man is dead in trespasses and sins. Consequently, God must regenerate those who He has determined will be saved, and literally "to hell" with everyone else.

 

Now, although the view of double predestination seems awful to non-Calvinists, it is important that one understands the Calvinist’s reasoning. For the Calvinist, God’s foreknowing precludes free-will. Thus, for the Calvinist all behavior is determined by God. For example, if God foreknows that Judas will betray Jesus, can God be wrong about what He knows? Nope. Therefore, Judas must betray Jesus as God knew. Were Judas to do otherwise, God would be mistaken in what He knows. Since God cannot be mistaken in what He knows, Judas cannot be able to do otherwise. If Judas is not able to do otherwise, he acts necessarily. Therefore, Judas has been predestined by God to betray Christ. That is to say, God is causing Judas to betray Christ.

 

In logical form, the argument is as follows:

 

Necessarily, God knows that Judas will betray Christ.

God cannot be mistaken in what He knows.

Therefore, necessarily, Judas will betray Christ

If Judas necessarily betrays Christ, he did not do so freely.

Therefore, God has predestined (i.e., predetermined) that Judas betray Christ.

 

The problem with this argument is that it is fallacious because it invalidly shifts the necessity from God’s knowing (premise 1) to Judas’s betraying (conclusion). Therefore, the argument confuses HOW God knows an event with HOW the event must arise. Let us look at some counter-examples to make this clear.

 

Eternally, God knows that Judas will betray Christ.

God cannot be mistaken in what He knows.

Therefore, eternally Judas will betray Christ

 

Unchangingly, God knows that Judas will betray Christ.

God cannot be mistaken in what He knows.

Therefore, unchangingly Judas will betray Christ

 

Timelessly, God knows that Judas will betray Christ.

God cannot be mistaken in what He knows.

Therefore, timelessly Judas will betray Christ

 

It does not follow because God eternally knows some event that the event which is known must be eternal. It does not follow because God unchangingly knows some event that the event which is known must be unchanging. It does not follow that because God timelessly knows some event that the event which is known must be timeless. Neither does it follow that because God necessarily knows an event that the event must be necessary.

 

Therefore, God necessarily knows events that will rise through non-necessary causes (e.g., a free-will choice), and God necessarily knows events that will rise through a necessary cause (e.g., gravity).

Thus, those who affirm that God’s foreknowledge preclude free-will err because they confuse God’s mode of knowing with the mode of being of what is known. Lastly, for the Calvinist God knows who will be saved based on His Sovereign will irrespective of any human wills.

 

Now, some who affirm free-will assert that God predestines man based on man's free-will choice. Thus, instead of predestination being determined solely by God's will, it is utlimately determined by man's will. This position asserts that because God knows what man shall choose, He elects those who will choose Him.

 

So on one hand, we have the Calvinist who affirms that man is saved contrary to his own will, and on the other hand, we have the Arminian who affirms that man is saved because of his own will. Both positions seems contrary to scripture. For no man is saved because of his own will, and yet no man is saved contrary to his own will. Why does one end up with these two mutually exclusive views?

 

One ends up on with these two "seemingly" mutually exclusive view because of an underlying presupposition that is maintained by both the Calvinist and the Arminian. They both assert that an act can only be performed by one agent. The Calvinist says that it is not man who chooses, therefore, it must be God. The Arminian says that it is not God who chooses, therefore, it must be man.

 

If one denies the presupposition and asserts that an act can be peformed by more than one agent, one can assert that BOTH God and man chooses. In other words, we are not saved contrary to our will (i.e., the Calvinist position), nor are we saved because of our will (i.e., the Arminian) position, but we are saved in accordance to God's will and according to our will inasmuch as our will is in accordance with God's will.

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