Please be sure to watch what you would consider a "I know all that stuff" type of video and you will see it fully flower towards the end.
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Found originally at Dr. Richard Howe’s website:
Banez, Dominic. The Primacy of Existence in Thomas Aquinas. Translated by Benjamin S. Llamzon. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1966.
Cahill, Mary Camilla. The Absolute and the Relative in St. Thomas and in Modern Philosophy. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1939.
Connell, Richard J. Substance and Modern Science. Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1988.
Eslick, Leonard J. "The Real Distinction: Reply to Professor Reece." Modern Schoolman 36 (January 1961): 149-160.
________. "Aristotle and the Identity of Indiscernibles." Modern Schoolman 36 (May 1959): 279-287.
Geisler, Norman L. "The Missing Premise in the Cosmological Argument." Modern Schoolman 56 (1978): 31-45.
________. Thomas Aquinas: An Evangelical Appraisal. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1991.
Gilson, Etienne. Being and Some Philosophers. Toronto, Canada: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952.
________. Dogmatism & Tolerance. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1952.
________. From Aristotle to Darwin and Back Again. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984.
________. God and Philosophy. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1941.
________. History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages. New York: Random House, 1955.
________. History of Philosophy and Philosophical Education. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1948.
________. Linguistic and Philosophy: An Essay on the Philosophical Constants of Language. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988.
________. Methodical Realism. Front Royal, VA: Christendom Press, 1990.
________. Painting and Reality. Cleveland: World Publishing, 1959.
________. Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1938.
________. The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy. Trans. by A. H. C. Downes. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1936.
________. The Spirit of Thomism. New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons, 1964.
________. Thomism: The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. A Translation of Le thomisme, sixth and final edition. Translated by Laurence K. Shook and Armand Maurer. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2003.
________. Thomist Realism and the Critique of Knowledge. Trans. by Mark A. Wauck. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1983.
________. The Unity of Philosophical Experience. Westminster, Maryland: Christian Classics, 1982.
Gilson, Etienne, and Thomas Langan. Modern Philosophy: Descartes to Kant. New York: Random House 1963.
Gilson, Etienne; Thomas Langan, and Armand A. Maurer. Recent Philosophy: Hegel to the Present. New York: Random House, 1966. Same as above.
John of St. Thomas. The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas. Yves R. Simon, John J. Glanville, G. Donald Hollenhorst, trans. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1955.
Klubertanz, George P. St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy. Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1960.
________. Philosophy of Human Nature. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953.
Klubertanz, George P., Maurice R. Holloway. Being and God: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Being and to Natural Theology. New York: Meredith Publishing Company, 1963.
Kretzman, Norman and Eleonore Stump, eds. The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Lauer, Rosemary. "The Notion of Efficient Cause in the Secunda Via." The Thomist 38 (1974): 754-767.
Mascall, E. L. Existence and Analogy: A Sequel to "He Who Is." London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1949. Reprinted n.c.: Archon Books, 1967.
________. He Who Is: A Study of Traditional Theism. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1943.
Maurer, Armand. Being and Knowing: Studies in Thomas Aquinas and Later Medieval Philosophers. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1990.
________. Medieval Philosophy. Vol. 2 of A History of Philosophy, ed. by Etienne Gilson. New York: Random House, 1962.
Maurer, Armand, ed. St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974 Commemorative Studies. 2 vols. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974.
Mondin, Baptista. The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968.
O’Callaghan, John P. Thomist Realism and the Linguistic Turn: Toward a More Perfect Form of Existence. Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 2003.
Ogden, Joan B. and Henry B. Veatch. "Putting the Square Back into Opposition." The New Scholasticism 30 (1956): 409-440.
Owens, Joseph. "Analogy as a Thomistic Approach to Being." Mediaeval Studies 24 (1962): 303-322.
________. "Aquinas and the Five Ways." Monist 58 (January 1974): 16-35.
________. "Aquinas and the Proof from the ‘Physics.’" Mediaeval Studies 28 (1966): 119-150.
________. "Aquinas on Being and Thing." In Thomistic Papers III, ed. Leonard A. Kennedy, 3-34. Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1987.
________. "Aquinas on Infinite Regress." Mind 71 (1962): 244-246.
________. "Aquinas’ Distinction at De Ente Et Essentia 4.119-123." Mediaeval Studies 48 (1986): 264-287.
________. "Aquinas—Existential Permanence and Flux." Mediaeval Studies 31 (1969): 71-92.
________. Cognition: An Epistemological Inquiry. Houston, Texas. Center for Thomistic Studies, 1992.
________ . The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics. Toronto, Canada: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1951.
________ . An Elementary Christian Metaphysics. Houston, Texas: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1963.
________ . A History of Ancient Western Philosophy. New York: Appleton, Century, Crofts, 1959.
________. An Interpretation of Existence. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1968. Reprint, Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, The University of St. Thomas, 1985.
________. St. Thomas Aquinas on the Existence of God: The Collected Papers of Joseph Owens. Edited by John R. Catan. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980.
________. "Stages and Distinction in De Ente: A Rejoinder." The Thomist 45 (1981): 99-123.
________. Towards a Christian Philosophy. Vol. 21 of Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, ed. Jude P. Dougherty. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1990.
Parker, Francis H. and Henry Babcock Veatch. Logic as a Human Instrument. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1959.
Rickaby, John. The First Principles of Knowledge. London: Longmans, Green, and Co. , 1916. Out of print.
Schmidt, Robert W. The Domain of Logic According to Saint Thomas Aquinas. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966.
Torrell, Jean-Pierre. Saint Thomas Aquinas. Vol. 1: The Person and His Work. Translated by Robert Royal. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996.
________. Saint Thomas Aquinas. Vol. 2: Spiritual Master. Translated by Robert Royal. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003.
Veatch, Henry Babcock. "Aristotelianism." In History of Philosophical Systems, ed. Vergilius Ferm, 106-117. Paterson, NJ: Littlefield, Adams, 1965.
________. "Book Review: ‘The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics: A Study in the Greek Background of Mediaeval Thought’ by Joseph Owens." Modern Schoolman 30 (January 1953): 146-151.
________. "Concerning the Ontological Status of Logical Forms." Review of Metaphysics 6 (December 1948): 40-64.
________. "Discussion: Reply to Professor Copi." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 3 (March 1951): 373-375.
________. "Discussion Article II: Two Logics, or One, or None?" New Scholasticism 47 (Summer 1973): 350-360.
________. For an Ontology of Morals: A Critique of Contemporary Ethical Theory. Evanstan: Northwestern University Press, 1971.
________. "Formalism and/or Intentionality in Logic." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 3 (March 1951): 348-365.
________. "In Defense of the Syllogism." Modern Schoolman 27 (March 1950): 184-202.
________. Intentional Logic: A Logic Based on Philosophical Realism. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952. Republished, n.c.: Archon Books, 1970.
________. "Philosophy’s Great Tradition: What Tasks Are Posed for It in Today’s World of Philosophy?" Modern Schoolman 69 (March/May 1992): 407-420.
________. "Reaffirmation of Intentionality: A Rejoinder to Monsignor Doyle." The New Scholasticism 28 (July 1954): 253-271.
________. Realism and Nominalism Revisited. The Aquinas Lecture, 1954. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1954.
________. Swimming Against the Current in Contemporary Philosophy: Occasional Essays and Papers. Vol. 20 of Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, ed. Jude P. Dougherty. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1990.
________. "St. Thomas and the Question, ‘How Are Synthetic Judgments A Priori Possible?’" Modern Schoolman 42 (March 1965): 239-263.
________. "The Truth of Metaphysics." Review of Metaphysics 17 (March 1964): 372-395.
________. Two Logics: The Conflict Between Classical and Neo-Analytic Philosophy. Evanstan: Northwestern University Press, 1969.
Weisheipl, James A. Friar Thomas D’Aquino: His Life, Thought and Works. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1974. Reprint, Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, n.d.
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Daniel A. Dombrowski, Rethinking the Ontological Argument: a Neoclassical Theistic Response, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 180pp., $70.00 (hbk), ISBN 0521863694.
Reviewed by Sandra Visser, Valparaiso University
Daniel Dombrowski offers an encyclopedic discussion of objections to the ontological argument in his most recent book. He writes as a neoclassical theist, inspired by the process theology of Charles Hartshorne. His theism is neoclassical rather than classical since according to it God exists in time and, although God is perfect, he is always changing as a result of his interaction with the created order. The book’s aim is ambitious — to discuss objections to and inadequacies of the ontological argument offered by deconstructionist, neopragmatist, and analytic thinkers. Dombrowski wishes to make positions across the spectrum accessible and intelligible to those from other intellectual traditions and profitably analyze them. His hope is that his readers receive a more robust understanding of the challenges facing the ontological argument and appreciate how neoclassical theism solves all the relevant problems. As a result, the way is clear to argue that the ontological argument, as understood by neoclassical theists, successfully proves the existence of God. Unfortunately, not all of Dombrowski’s ambitions are realized in his book. His scope ends up being too broad for him to convincingly dispatch all the objections to the ontological argument, and his existence/actuality distinction, the key to his position, does not save the ontological argument from what he takes to be a damning criticism.
Dombrowski’s book is frequently frustrating to read. He regularly cites other scholars of the ontological argument. It is a strength of the book that Dombrowski has read widely on the topic and attempts to synthesize much of what has been written. Further, it is good that he attempts to bring various authors into dialogue with each other. Unfortunately, given the monograph’s length, what the reader typically gets is a very short summary, frequently just a sentence or two, from the cited author. As a result, one doesn’t get enough context or explanation to fully understand the points the cited author might be making, or have enough information to either agree or disagree intelligently with the point Dombrowski is using his source to make. For example, Dombrowski says that "As Griffin insightfully sees the matter, there are at least four characteristics that are essential to the classical theistic view of God." One of them is that "If and when God loves the creatures, this is a free act; nothing prevents God’s hating or being indifferent to the creatures" (137). Dombrowski’s summary of Griffin’s position is inadequately explained. What does Griffin mean by "nothing prevents God’s hating or being indifferent to the creatures?" Does Griffin mean that there is no force or being outside of God (something that is not God) which prevents him from hating creatures? If so, then the claim is not particularly controversial, but is rather uninteresting since God’s character makes it impossible for him to hate his creatures. On the other hand, does Griffin mean that God could hate his creatures, but he has decided not to? That claim is a highly contentious one that few classical theists would agree with. If the latter is the correct interpretation of the claim, it would be helpful to have at least a brief sketch of how Griffin arrived at the insight. In the absence of an argument, a classical theist might reasonably reject the view that she is committed to the position that God could hate his creatures. And further, she would be justified in rejecting Dombrowski’s criticism on the grounds that it proceeds from a peculiar thesis of Griffin’s rather than from a position entailed by classical theism itself.
Dombrowski introduces his book as containing chapters which can fruitfully be read as a whole, but can also be read independently of each other, as a reader’s interests may dictate. To some degree that is true. The book does not contain a sustained argument across the chapters, the thread of which would be lost if sampling only a chapter or two. However, some claims and references made in earlier or later chapters would be baffling if not read in light of the other chapters in the book or other works by Dombrowski. He regularly refers to the existence-actuality distinction as key to the success of the ontological argument, but only discusses it in any depth in Chapter 5 and doesn’t give an adequate explanation of it in the chapters in which he merely refers to it. He mentions views of analytic philosophers in chapters about continental philosophers and refers to the substance of arguments he makes in later chapters. Thus, while one could read a chapter here and there, the book is best read as a whole, but a slightly disjointed whole, given Dombrowski’s intention to make each chapter self-contained.
Finally, the most significant difficulty in reading Dombrowski’s book and thus finding his work convincing arises from his desire to address as many objections to the ontological argument as possible. He races through objection after objection, covering lots of ground, but only thinly, and too often arguing by assertion or by appeal to other authorities’ views. But the rapid rejection of views is too quick, and it is sure to frustrate holders of most of the views he critiques. Even though several of his chapters deal with only one author, Dombrowski covers many objections both major and minor in each one. The result is that the reader rarely gets an intellectually satisfying discussion of any of the objections. For example, he merely states that to think that humans live forever is hubris, but offers no explanation for why it’s hubris other than that "[w]hat makes God distinctive is necessary existence and other perfections (134)." But a reader might quickly object that even if humans were immortal, they would not be necessary beings and so would be no threat to the distinctiveness of God for that reason. Moreover, he seems to regard belief in the doctrine of the Christian faith ("I believe in . . . the resurrection of the body, and the life everlasting") as hubris. Were Dombrowski to offer a more complete discussion of his point initially, he might easily forestall such reactions.
A second example of this problem occurs when he argues against a position that he attributes to Mark Taylor, namely that "if the universe is not centered in God then the centered self disintegrates as well, and, as a result, epistemological and moral criteria disintegrate (64)." Dombrowski rejects the view by replying that some philosophers, e.g. Sartre and Popper, don’t believe in God and that this fact alone should not disqualify them from doing philosophy. Presumably Taylor is well aware that some atheists engage in what has traditionally been called philosophy and has given reasons to believe that either they are not really engaged in philosophy by explaining what he takes real philosophy to be. Again, a more thorough discussion of Taylor’s views and Dombrowski’s response to them would forestall criticisms of his analysis.
Of the many substantive difficulties I have with the book, I briefly will discuss only one. But it is the point that Dombrowski appears to take as one of the most important distinctions neoclassical theists can make, namely, the distinction between existence and actuality. The distinction is supposed to enable neoclassical theists to avoid the alleged problem, which Dombrowski takes to be a good one, that the ontological argument deduces something about concrete reality from a mere definition. According to Dombrowski, a neoclassical theist claims that the ontological argument proves no more than the existence of God, and the fact that God exists cannot be used to deduce which properties in particular God has. (Dombrowski does say that whatever attributes God has, we know they are consistent with God’s being perfect.) As a result, he claims that God’s existence is abstract. God’s actuality, on the other hand, is concrete. God’s actuality, according to Dombrowski, is how God exists. By how God exists, Dombrowski means which properties or attributes God has as a result of his existing in time in the actual world. Dombrowski doesn’t think one can deduce most of God’s attributes from an argument because he takes it that God exists in time (another key neoclassical assertion) and in a world that is always changing. God reacts to the world as it continues to change, and so which specific properties God has are contingent ones — ones based on how the world, and humans in it, change as time progresses. So, according to Dombrowski, although God is perfect (this much we know from the ontological argument), how God’s perfection manifests itself is not a matter we can ascertain a priori.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the distinction neoclassical theists make is a good one, it is not at all clear how the purported distinction is supposed to escape the problem. The problem with the ontological argument, recall, is supposed to be that merely by considering the concept of God, one sees that God must exist. That is to say that just by analyzing a concept, one can conclude something about how the world actually is. Dombrowski says that because neoclassical theists do not make many claims about which properties God actually has, they do not make any concrete claims about God and thus escape the objection. But a closer examination of his view shows that Dombrowski’s own interpretation of the argument yields the same objectionable result, i.e., that on the basis of conceptual analysis we can conclude something about concrete reality. He writes, "Anselm’s discovery. . . was that contingent existence is not compatible with perfection, hence God’s existence is either impossible or necessary (89)." Dombrowski falls on the side of believing that the ontological argument shows that God’s existence is necessary, and that a necessarily existing being exists in all possible circumstances. Whether one believes that all of God’s properties are ones God has necessarily or that some of God’s properties are contingent, God, a being, still exists. Just because one doesn’t know which properties God has doesn’t mean that one isn’t immediately committed to God’s concrete existence. Moreover, we must know at least something about that being, or the claim that the being exists would be without cognitive content for us. And Dombrowski does apparently say that we know two things about God from the ontological argument: that he exists necessarily, and that he is perfect. Dombrowski’s own views entail that if God exists necessarily, God exists concretely, i.e. actually, in all possible circumstances.
Dombrowski’s book, while it brings together a host of objections and responses to the ontological argument from across traditional disciplinary boundaries, attempts to solve too many problems in too short a space. The book succeeds in making readers aware that the ontological argument is one that scholars hailing from a wide range of intellectual traditions should take seriously, but fails in defending the neoclassical theists’ position as the only one worth holding.
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If what we see in radio, TV and print is any indication, then this Christianity Today article might be on target. They state what seemed obvious to many Pentecostals, just ten years ago.
Pentecostals, it is said, believe that speaking in tongues is the initial evidence of the baptism of the Holy Spirit. The charismatic gift was at the center of Charles Parham’s Bible school revival in 1901 and William Seymour’s Azusa Street phenomenon in 1906. It is, after all, one of the main reasons for the name Pentecostals (see Acts 2). But in an October survey from the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, at least 40 percent of Pentecostals in six of the ten countries surveyed said they had never prayed or spoken in tongues. Only half of U. S. Pentecostals had spoken in tongues.
However,
As common as belief in miraculous gifts, however, is faith in the prosperity gospel. Renewalists overwhelmingly agree that "God will grant material prosperity to all believers who have enough faith." In Nigeria, 95 percent of Pentecostals agree with that statement, and 97 percent agree that "God will grant good health and relief from sickness to believers who have enough faith." In the Philippines, 99 percent of Pentecostals agreed with the latter statement.
Finally,
But for now, as the Pew Forum survey shows, Pentecostalized Christianity is nearly synonymous with the prosperity gospel. So while we listen to our brothers and sisters, we also need to proclaim biblical truths that counter the "health and wealth" message. The spiritual gift most needed in the 21st century is the gift of discernment (1 Cor. 12:10).
This is disturbing to say the least. For years this has been my beef with the "popular" side of the Pentecostal movement. Although there has been discernment among some schools, seminaries and missionary endeavors; there has been such a lax and conformity to every theological wind that blows their way. I have always said that some Pentecostal entities in Spanish speaking countries (as far as I know), eat off of the theological breadcrumbs that fall off of the American doctrinal table. Let me qualify this: Aberrant movements such as the laughter, gold teeth, laughing, spitting, howling in the spirit, oil and gold rain, etc. etc become popular, then die out and finally resurrect somewhere in Mexico or Latin America. Now, with the new "Guttenberg," (mediums) these practices take an immediate life of their own through the use of internet, radio and TV.
This new "bling" gospel affects churches and families alike. The assumption that something is wrong with you if you are not rich is a common denominator among a lot of churches. Sola “bling” seems to be one of the "new" funnymentals of the Christian faith. That is why we have fallen into irrelevance before the world and the treasure chest of our faith has been sunk by the weight of the bullions of prosperity. I wonder what penalty we will get for asking before our retirement for our spiritual 401k. Furthermore, I also thought that our "treasures in heaven" were meant for heaven and not earth. I wonder if there is more to the prodigal son than just the return of the "lost one." If his asking for his inheritance before his time teaches us anything, then, at the very least, it is a sign of the troubles my brethren might similarly fall into.
Feel free to pass this on and or leave a comment if you want.
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Scientific theory and religious beliefs will collide when Dr. Michael Shermer and Paul A. Nelson debate “Evolution vs. Intelligent Design” at Penn State Berks on Wednesday, December 6, 2006, at 7:30 p.m. in the Perkins Student Center Auditorium. This event is free and open to the public.
Dr. Michael Shermer, a leading proponent of evolutionary theory, is a scientific historian, monthly contributor to Scientific American, and the publisher of Skeptic magazine. He maintains that intelligent design is not science and has no place in science classes, arguments explored in his book, Why Darwin Matters: Evolution and the Case Against Intelligent Design. Shermer is the director of the Skeptics Society, co-host of the Family Channel program Exploring the Unknown, and author of numerous books including Science Friction and Why People Believe Weird Things.
Paul A. Nelson is a philosopher of biology who received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, where he specialized in the philosophy of biology and evolutionary theory. He is currently a fellow of the Discovery Institute and an adjunct professor in the Science and Religion program at Biola University. Nelson’s articles have appeared in Biology & Philosophy, Zygon, Rhetoric and Public Affairs, and Touchstone, His forthcoming monograph, On Common Descent, critically evaluates the theory of common descent. He is a member of the Society for Developmental Biology (SDB) and the International Society for the History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Biology (ISHPSSB).
For more information on this event, contact the Campus Life Office at 610-396-6076.
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