Decree of Approval of some theses contained in the Doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas and proposed to the Teachers of Philosophy
They are as follows:
I.
Potentia et actus ita dividunt ens, ut quidquid est, vel sit actus purus, vel ex potentia et actu tamquam primis atque intrinsecis principiis necessario coalescat.
Potency and act divide being in such a way that whatever is, is either a pure act, or else coalesces necessarily from potency and act as from its first and intrinsic principles.
II.
Actus, utpote perfectio, non limitatur nisi per potentiam, quae est capacitas perfectionis. Proinde in quo ordine actus est purus, in eodem nonnisi illimitatus et unicus exsistit; ubi vero est finitus ac multiplex, in veram incidit cum potentia compositionem.
An act, as perfection, is limited only by a potency, which is a capacity for a perfection. Hence in any order in which which an act is pure, in that same order that act exists as unique and unlimited; where an act is finite and multiple, that act has entered into a true composition with a potency
III.
Quapropter in absoluta ipsius esse ratione unus subsistit Deus, unus est simplicissimus, cetera cuncta quae ipsum esse participant, naturam habent quae esse coarctatur, ac tamquam distinctis realiter principiis, essentia et esse constant.
On this account, the one God, unique and most simple, subsists in the absolute reason of His existence. All other things that participate in His existence, have a nature which restricts their being, and they consist of essence and existence as of really distinct principles.
IV.
Ens, quod denominatur ab esse, non univoce de Deo ac de creaturis dicitur, nec tamen prorsus aequivoce, sed analogice, analogia tum attributionis tum proportionalitis.
[The noun/participle] "Being", which takes its name from [the verb] "to be", is not spoken in the same univocal sense of God and of creatures, but neither is it spoken equivocally, but analogically, by an analogy of attribution or proportionality.
V.
Est praeterea in omni creatura realis compositio subiecti subsistentis cum formis secundario additis, sive acccidentibus: ea vero, nisi esse realiter in essentia distincta reciperetur, intelligi non posset.
Furthermore, in every creature there is a real composition of the subsisting subject with forms that are added secondarily, that is, with accidents: these accidents, however, cannot be understand unless "to-be" is really received in an essence disinct from the accidents.
VI.
Praeter absoluta accidentia est etiam relativum,sive ad aliquid. Quamvis enim ad aliquid non significet secundum propriam rationem aliquid alicui inhaerens, saepe tamen causam in rebus habet, et ideo realem entitatem distinctam a subiecto.
Apart from absolute accidents, there is also the relative accident, in other words "in relation to something". Although "in relation to someting" does not on its own account signify anything inherent to another thing, yet it often has a cause in things, and therefore it has real entity [existence?] distinct from its subject.
VII.
Creatura spiritualis est in sua essentia omnino simplex. Sed remanet in ea compositio duplex: essentiae cum esse et substantiae cum accidentibus.
The spiritual creature is completely simple in its essence, but a two-fold composition remains within it: the composition of essence with existence and that of substance with accidents.
VIII.
Creatura vero corporalis est quoad ipsam essentiam composita potentia et actu; quae potentia et actus ordinis essentiae, materiae et formae nominibus designantur.
The corporeal creature, with respect to its essence, is composed of potency and act; in the order of essence, this potency and act are designated by the names matter and form.
IX.
Earum partium neutra per se esse habet, nec per se producitur vel corrumpitur, nec ponitur in praedicamento nisi reductive ut principium substantiale.
Neither of their parts has existence per se, neiter is either part produced or corruped, nor is it regarded as a category unless as being related or led back to a substantial principle.
X.
Etsi corpoream naturam extensio in partes integrales consequitur, non tamen idem est corpori esse substantiam et esse quantum. Substantia quippe ratione sui indivisibilis est, non quidem ad modum puncti, sed ad modum eius quod est extra ordinem dimensionis. Quantitas vero,quae extensionem substantiae tribuit, a substantia realiter differt, et est veri nominis accidens.
Although extension into integral parts is a consequence of a corporeal nature, it is not the same thing for a body to be a substance and for it to be of a certain quantity. By definition, a substance is indivisible, not in the same way as a point, but as something which is outside the order of dimension. Quantity, which gives extension to substance, in reality differs from substance, and is an accident in the fully meaning of the term.
XI.
Quantitate signata materia principium est individuationis, id est, numericae distinctionis, quae in puris spiritibus esse non potest, unius individui ab alio in eadem natura specifica.
The principle of individuation, that is, of numeric distinction, is matter designated by quantity. Numeric distinction, the distinction of one individual from another in the same specific nature, cannot be found among pure spirits.
XII.
Eadem efficitur quantitate ut corpus circumscriptive sit in loco, et in uno tantum loco de quacumque potentia per hunc modum esse possit.
The fact that a body is circumscriptively in a place [that a body is in its surroundings] and that a body can be in only one place, no matter what force is applied to it, is the effect of the body's quantity.
XIII.
Corpora dividuntur bifariam: quaedam enim sunt viventia, quaedam expertia vitae. In viventibus, ut in eodem subiecto pars movens et pars mota per se habeantur, forma substantialis, animae nomine designata, requirit organicam dispositionem, seu partes heterogeneas.
Bodies are divided into two types: some are living, others don't have life. In living bodies, in order that the part that causes movement and the part that is moved may be distinct, the substantial form, which is designated by the term "soul", requires an organic disposition, in other words, heterogeneous parts.
XIV.
Vegetalis et sensilis ordinis animae nequaquam per se subsistunt, nec per se producuntur, sed sunt tantummodo ut principium quo vivens est et vivit, et cum a materia se totis dependeant, corrupto composito, eo ipso per accidens corrumpuntur.
Souls belonging to the [merely] vegetable or sensory order cannot subsist per se, nor can they be produced per se, but are merely as the principle by which the living thing is and lives, and since such souls depend in their entirety upon matter, when the composite thing is corrupted, then such souls are incidentally corrupted as well.
XV.
Contra, per se subsistit anima humana, quae, cum subiecto sufficienter disposito potest infundi, a Deo creatur, et sua natura incorruptibilis est atque immortalis.
On the other hand, the human soul persists per se. The human soul is created by God when it can be poured into a subject that is sufficiently disposed, and its nature is incorruptible and immortal.
XVI.
Eadem anima rationalis ita unitur corpori, ut sit eiusdem forma substantialis unica, et per ipsam habet homo ut sit homo et animal et vivens et corpus et substantia et ens. Tribuit igitur anima homini omnem gradum perfectionis essentialem; insuper communicat corpori actum essendi quo ipsa est.
The same rational soul is united to the body in such a way as to be the unique substantial form of the body, and through the soul man has the properties of being a man and an animal and a living thing and a body and a substance and a being. The soul therefore gives man every essential degree of perfection. Furthermore, the soul communicates to the body the act of being whereby the soul itself exists.
XVII.
Duplicis ordinis facultates, organicae et inorganicae, ex anima humana per naturalem resultantiam emanant: priores, ad quas sensus pertinet, in composito subiectantur, posteriores in anima sola. Est igitur intellectus facultas ab organo intrinsece independens.
From the human soul there issues forth in a natural sequence faculties belonging both the organic and inorganic order. The former faculties, to which pertain the senses, have as their subject the composite being, while the latter have the soul alone as their subject. Thus the intellect is a faculty that is intrinsically independent of any organ.
XVIII.
Immaterialitatem necessario sequitur intellectualitas, et ita quidem ut secundum gradus elongationis a materia, sint quoque gradus intellectualitatis. Adaequatum intellectionis obiectum est communiter ipsum ens; proprium vero intellectus humani in praesenti statu unionis, quidditatibus abstractis a conditionibus materialibus continetur.
Intellectuality is a necessary consequence of immateriality, such that the degree of intellectuality is proportional to the degree of distance from matter. Being itself (any being) is the adequate object of intellection; but in the present state of union [of body/soul] the proper object of the human intellect is found in quiddities abstracted from their material conditions.
XIX.
Cognitionem ergo accipimus a rebus sensibilibus. Cum autem sensibile non sit intelligibile in actu, praeter intellectum formaliter intelligentem, admittenda est in anima virtus activa, quae species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus abstrahat.
We receive knowledge from sensible things. Since a sensible thing is not intelligible in act, than apart from the intellect as it understands in the formal sense, we must admit the existence in the soul of an active power that abstracts intelligible species from phantasms.
XX.
Per has species directe universalia cognoscimus; singularia sensu attingimus, tum etiam intellectu per conversionem ad phantasmata; ad cognitionem vero spiritualium per analogiam ascendimus.
By these species we directly know universals; we attain to singulars by sense, and then we know them by the intellect by turning our attention to phantasms; but we rise to a knowledge of spiritual beings by way of analogy.
XXI.
Intellectum sequitur, non praecedit, voluntas, quae necessario appetit id quod sibi praesentatur tamquam bonum ex omni parte explens appetitum, sed inter plura bona, quae iudicio mutabili appetenda proponuntur, libere eligit. Sequitur proinde electio iudicium practicum ultimum; at quod sit ultimum, voluntas efficit.
The will follows the intellect. The will does not precede the intellect. The will necessarily desires that which is presented to it as a good that in every way can satisfy desire, but among the many goods that are proposed to it as desirable by a judgement that is subject to change, the will freely chooses. Thus, a choice follows the last practical judgement, and the will makes that judgement into the last one.
XXII.
Deum esse neque immediata intuitione percipimus, neque a priori demonstramus, sed utique a posteriori, hoc est, per ea quae facta sunt, ducto argumento ab effectibus ad causam: videlicet, a rebus quae moventur ad sui motus principium et primum motorem immobilem; a processu rerum mundanarum e causis inter se subordinatis, ad primam causam incausatam; a corruptibilibus quae aequaliter se habent ad esse et non esse, ad ens absolute necessarium; ab iis quae secundum minoratas perfectiones essendi, vivendi, intelligendi, plus et minus sunt, vivunt, intelligunt, ad eum qui est maxime intelligens, maxime vivens, maxime ens; denique, ab ordine universi ad intellectum separatum qui res ordinavit, disposuit, et dirigit ad finem.
We cannot perceive God's existence by immediate intuition, nor can we demonstrate His existence a priori, but we demonstrate His existence a posteriori, that is, by the things which have been made, with a line of argument that leads from effects to cause; namely, from things which are moved to the principle of their motion and the first immobile mover; from the progression of the things of the world from causes that are subordinate to one another, to the first uncaused cause; from corruptible things which are equally disposed to existence and to non-existence, to the absolutely necessary being; from tings which according to diminished perfections of existing, living, understanding, exist, live and understand in greater and lesser degrees, to that which is intelligent to the highest degree, most alive, most fully being; finally, from the order of the universe to the separated intellect that has ordered and arranged things, and which directs them to an end.
XXIII.
Divina Essentia, per hoc quod exercitae actualitati ipsius esse identificatur, seu per hoc quod est ipsum Esse subsistens, in sua veluti metaphysica ratione bene nobis constituta proponitur, et per hoc idem rationem nobis exhibet suae infinitatis in perfectione.
The Divine Essence, by the fact that it is identified with the exercized actuality of its own being, in other terms, by the fact that it is itself subsistent Being, is set forth for us well expressed in its own metaphysical meaning. Thereby also it shows us the reason for its infinity in perfection.
XXIV.
Ipsa igitur puritate sui esse, a finitis omnibus rebus secernitur Deus. Inde infertur primo, mundum nonnisi per creationem a Deo procedere potuisse; deinde virtutem creativam, qua per se primo attingitur ens in quantum ens, nec miraculose ulli finitae naturae esse communicabilem; nullum denique creatum agens in esse cuiuscumque effectus influere, nisi motione accepta a prima causa.
God is set apart from all finite thing by the very purity of His being. The first inference from this is that the world could not have proceded from God except by way of creatin. Next, that te creative power, by which a being insofar as it is a being is achieved, cannot be shared with any created nature, not even by a miracle. Finally, no created agent can influence the existence of any effeect, unless it is by a motion that has been received from the first cause.
Datum Romae, die 27 iulii 1914.
B. Card Lorenzelli, Praefectus
Ascensus Dandini, a Secretis
L + S.
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By J P Moreland: James Porter Moreland (born 1948), commonly referred to as J.P. Moreland, is an American philosopher, theologian, and Christian apologist.
